Storage losses, liquidity constraints, and maize storage decisions in Benin by Kadjo, D. et al.
AGRICULTURAL
ECONOMICS
Agricultural Economics 00 (2018) 1–20
Storage losses, liquidity constraints, and maize storage decisions in Benin
Didier Kadjoa,∗, Jacob Ricker-Gilbertb, Tahirou Abdoulayec, Gerald Shivelyb, Mohamed N. Bacod
aONYX, BP 650 Abidjan 17, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire
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Abstract
This article estimates how storage losses from mold, insects, and other pests, combined with liquidity constraints, influence a smallholder farm
household’s decision to store maize on farm after harvest. We analyze panel data from 309 smallholders in Benin covering the 2011 and 2013
harvest seasons. Results suggest that smallholders are driven to sell at harvest time for different reasons, depending on their motivation for storing.
In households that report direct consumption as their primary goal for storing maize, liquidity constraints, not storage losses, reduce the amount
they store. In contrast, households that store maize with the intention of selling it later in the year appear unaffected by liquidity constraints.
Instead, these households store less when they expect to lose more during storage. These results suggest that policies to provide liquidity will be
more helpful in motivating storage among consumption-oriented households. Households motivated to store for later sale will benefit from modern
storage technologies that mitigate the operational costs associated with storage losses.
JEL classifications: C13, C23, D13, O12, O13
Keywords: Liquidity constraints; Storage losses; Benin; Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Introduction
Smallholder farm households throughout the developing
world often sell substantial portions of their staple crop out-
put immediately after harvest, a time when prices are low, only
to repurchase the same staples later in the year at higher prices.
That this behavior occurs, despite seemingly clear evidence that
households could benefit from holding grain into the lean pe-
riod, constitutes an important economic and food security chal-
lenge. The stylized pattern points to several major constraints
facing smallholder households.
In this regard, economic research focuses on liquidity con-
straints as a major impediment to storage. Many smallholder
farm households face substantial financial outlays at harvest
time, including loan repayments from planting time and school
fees. In the absence of credit or sufficient off-farm income, a
household’s only option may be to generate cash by selling
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a portion of newly harvested crops (Abdoulaye and Sanders,
2005, 2006). For example, Stephens and Barrett (2011) show
that asset-poor Kenyan households are more likely to “sell low”
and “buy high” than better-off households. Burke (2014) also
finds that access to credit at the time of harvest allows Kenyan
households to hold a larger proportion of their maize harvest
to sell later in the year.1 Therefore, liquidity constraints can
lead to a suboptimal outcome when households cannot take the
advantage of temporal price arbitrage opportunities that often
occur when grain is stored for sale later in the year.
In contrast, the entomology literature focuses on quantity
losses in storage due to mold, insects, and other pests as the
reason smallholders do not store more grain at harvest. Insects
such as the larger grain borer (LGB) are prevalent across much
of Africa and Asia and can reportedly cause losses of up to
1 Basu and Wong (2015) report findings from a randomized evaluation of two
seasonal programs in West Timor, Indonesia that included access to food storage
equipment at zero cost, and access to credit. They find that the credit program
improves the low harvest-to-lean period of rice marginal rate of transformation
by allowing households to borrow against future harvests. In a recent study,
Michler and Balagtas (2016) use consumption and net income data from rural
households in Bangladesh to find that precautionary rice storage levels vary
little across income quartiles.
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30% in maize after six months of storage (Affognon et al.,
2015; Boxall, 2002; Golob, 2002). Faced with high rates of
potential losses, selling maize at harvest may be an optimal
strategy to avoid losses due to pest damage. Although some
empirical evidence from Kenya, South America, and Ethiopia
indicates that modern storage technologies such as hermetic
(airtight) bags, metal silos, and/or chemical protectants may
reduce losses from insect damage and thereby improve house-
holds’ food and income security, access to these technologies
is severely limited, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA;
Bokusheva et al., 2012; Gitonga et al., 2013, Tesfaye and Tiri-
vavi, 2018). Lack of access to effective storage technologies
may prevent smallholder households from storing grain at har-
vest for consumption or sale later in the year. Yet, Kaminski and
Christiaensen (2014) use nationally representative data from
smallholder households in three countries in SSA (Malawi,
Uganda, and Tanzania) and find that many smallholder farm-
ers believe their postharvest losses (PHLs) are small (between
1.4% and 5.9% of self-reported quantity produced is reportedly
lost in storage). Thus, these findings contrast with the entomol-
ogy literature and therefore beg the question of how large these
quantity losses actually are, and to what extent do expectations
about these losses influence a smallholder household’s grain
management decisions?
The objective of the present article is to estimate the extent
to which storage concerns and liquidity constraints affect the
quantity of maize that a household decides to store at harvest
for sale or consumption later in the year. We use two waves of
household-level panel data from 309 smallholder households
that cultivate maize in Benin. We specifically test two hypothe-
ses: (1) whether the amount of maize that a household expects
to lose due to pests has a statistically significant effect on the
quantity of maize stored after harvest; and (2) whether liquidity
constraints exert an influence over the quantity of maize stored
after harvest. In the case of storage, we focus on a household’s
expectation of storage losses. We use information collected at
the time of harvest about how much maize farmers expected
to lose during subsequent storage due to mold, insects, and
other pests. We measure a household’s liquidity constraint as
the amount of cash savings on hand at the beginning of the
harvest. We also use the number of children in school during
the current year for whom school expenses would need to be
paid, as an additional proxy for liquidity constraints.
Despite a recognition of the economic importance of storage
losses, the economics literature tends to embed storage loss and
storage technology as components of overall storage costs rather
than modeling them separately (see Brennan, 1958; Fuglie
1995; Park, 2006, Renkow, 1990; Saha and Stroud, 1994).2 We
contribute to the applied economics and food security literature
2 A third strand of literature indicates that price risk affects the household’s
storage decision (see Park, 2006; Renkow, 1990; Saha and Stroud, 1994).
However, these studies focus in South Asia, where the prevalence of multiple
cropping seasons in a calendar year make intraseasonal price fluctuations much
less severe, compared to the unimodal production systems in most parts of
SSA where intraseasonal price fluctuations are much more pronounced. Since
by explicitly taking into account storage losses as a measure
of the technology constraint that smallholders face, while si-
multaneously considering liquidity constraints in a household’s
maize allocation decision at harvest. Moreover, we measure the
effects of these constraints by classifying households by what
they say their goal was for their stored maize at the end of
the harvest period.3 Households may store maize for sale, con-
sumption, future use as seed or some combination thereof. For
the purpose of our analysis, we group households into two cate-
gories: market-oriented households and consumption-oriented
households. The former includes those who store all or a share
of their maize for sale during the postharvest season. The latter
includes those who store maize for consumption or future use
as seed, with no intention of selling it.
We address potential issues of endogeneity using a
household-level fixed effect (FE) estimator to control for time-
constant unobserved heterogeneity. Although households’ risk
aversion may be accounted for by households’ unobserved het-
erogeneity, accounting for what households say their goal was
for their stored maize may also reflect time-varying risk aver-
sion and food consumption preferences for maize. By including
this goal in the model, we can at least partially control for this
issue. Although we strive to obtain unbiased estimates for the
tested covariates, we recognize that we cannot make strong
causal inference in the context of observational data. Neverthe-
less, this article highlights important associations between the
tested covariates and households’ decisions to store at harvest.
Our results indicate that if a household stores maize with the
intention of selling it later in the year, it will store less maize
when it expects storage losses to be higher ceteris paribus.
Conversely, when a household stores maize with the goal of
consuming it, expected losses have no statistically significant
effect on how much maize it stores. Having access to cash sav-
ings at harvest has the opposite effect: it does not affect the
quantity of maize stored by households that store with the in-
tention of selling it later in the year. However, having access to
cash increases the quantity of maize stored by those who store
with the intention of consuming it later in the year. Based on
these findings, we conclude that consumption-oriented house-
holds and market-oriented households both tend to “sell low”
at harvest time. However, the reasons differ. For the former, liq-
uidity constraints appear to motivate sales; for the latter, storage
constraints are the driver. This implies that a single policy in-
tervention to encourage households to hold grain after harvest
is unlikely to work for all smallholders. In the next section,
we motivate our analysis by discussing the overall context of
storage losses and maize marketing in Benin. We offer a brief
conceptual framework that accommodates multiple motivations
and multiple constraints on smallholder stockholding behavior.
We then describe our data, empirical approach, and estimation
we have limited data for price series at the community level, we control for
farmers’ expectation about price increases in our empirical model, but do not
make it a central part of the article.
3 Food allocation decisions in rural areas of SSA are likely to reflect, at least
partially, households’ goals (Berkhout et al., 2010).
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Fig. 1. Maize consumption and production cycle.
Notes: Fig. 1 presents the second harvest season in the South and Center; the first harvest season in these regions starts around July/August.
strategy. The final sections report econometric results and our
conclusions.
2. Storage losses and maize marketing in Benin
2.1. Storage losses
Maize is the main staple crop for most people in Benin.
Maize production and storage practices differ among regions
due to local consumption patterns and maize’s comparative
advantages compared to other crops. Maize is largely produced
for consumption in the south whereas in many regions from the
center and north it is also an important cash crop.
PHL, especially storage losses, due to insect pests attacking
stored maize continues to be a major threat to food and income
security in Benin. The National Institute of Statistics in Benin
estimates maize production to have been 1,165 million tons in
2011/2012. Data from our surveys suggest that total storage
losses were about 8% on average in 2011/2012. Other studies
estimate storage losses between 15% and 30% for maize in
Benin depending on location (ADA, 2010). The dryer Sudan
Savannah in the North records storage losses of 2.5%, while
in the Guinea Savannah in the center of the country average
storage losses can reach 10% (Adda et al., 2002). In contrast,
higher average losses are observed in more humid areas such
as southern Benin where insect pressure is also greater due to
high air moisture and high temperatures that are both favorable
for insect propagation. Storage losses in the south can report-
edly reach 20–50% after six months of storage with traditional
structures (Maboudou et al., 2004).4
Despite efforts to reduce storage losses through introduc-
tion of improved storage technologies in the late 1990s, storage
practices remain largely traditional and thus create substantial
4 Kaminski and Christiansen (2014) describe and estimate how postharvest
losses could evolve over time and depending on climatic conditions.
risk of storage loss. More recent storage technologies, such
as hermetic bags and metal silos, have had limited promotion
in Benin. Application of chemical insecticides to stored maize
remains the only modern technology that is widely used by
households to prevent insect pest damage. Recommended in-
secticides such as Sophagrain and Actellic were promoted by
projects that facilitated credit access and supplied these pro-
tectants (Adegbola, 2010). Unfortunately, the implementation
of these projects did not address other long-term constraints
to adoption of these new technologies such as high costs and
availability of products (Adegbola, 2010). Thus, many house-
holds do not have access to appropriate storage technologies to
store maize over an extended period. They still use traditional
conservation measures or farm pesticides, especially chemicals
intended for cotton, or other chemicals believed to be appro-
priate to deal with pest damage (Adegbola, 2010; Hell et al.,
2008; PAN, 2010). Even though these inappropriate pesticides
may preserve maize stock from pest damage, their common
use among households raises serious health concerns. Unfortu-
nately, there is no formal quality control mechanism in infor-
mal markets, which creates an information asymmetry between
consumers and households that apply chemicals on maize.
2.2. Maize marketing
Maize price varies sharply within the marketing season in
Benin. Even though the national food agency releases stocks to
attempt to smooth out market supplies and limit price surges,
our data indicate that average annual price increases within the
season are 80% and can even reach 200% from harvest to lean
period in some areas. Although the differences in the timing
of harvest periods among the different regions of Benin con-
tributes to reducing the imbalance of maize availability across
the country, it does not come close to eliminating intra-seasonal
price variability (Fig. 1).
Regardless, few smallholder households in Benin are likely to
benefit from intra-seasonal price variability when they sell their
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maize. Most of them sell immediately after harvest or during
the early postharvest period to pay prior-year debts for which
payments are often due during this period or to face seasonal
expenses.5 As in many other West African countries, the harvest
season in Benin coincides with religious and traditional celebra-
tions and the beginning of the nine-month academic year. Pri-
mary and secondary schools start around September/October,
which corresponds to the harvest seasons in many regions of
Benin. Therefore, many liquidity-constrained households may
be obligated to sell their maize at harvest to pay school ex-
penses or other fees.6 As such, they tend to be locked into the
“sell-low,” “buy-high” phenomenon. The ubiquity of this pat-
tern makes Benin an ideal setting to study the factors associated
with maize storage decisions.
3. Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework used in this article is a two-season
additively separable utility maximization model adapted from
Saha and Stroud (1994). The model encompasses one con-
sumption cycle, starting with harvest and extending through
the postharvest season, ending before the subsequent harvest.
To evaluate households’ grain storage, the harvest season is
broadly understood as the beginning of maize harvest on farm
until the end of harvest when all grain has been removed from
the field and stored. Postharvest season starts when the house-
hold starts sourcing its grain from its stock or from market. This
season ends at the beginning of the new harvest (see Fig. 1). We
assume the household produces one main staple crop, maize.
Production occurs prior to harvest and the start of the consump-
tion cycle.
In each season (harvest and postharvest), the household ob-
tains utility from consuming the main staple grain M and a
composite nonfood good Y. The household’s decision during
the consumption cycle is then a utility maximization problem
over the harvest season (subscript H) and the postharvest season
(subscript L), as seen in Eq. (1).
Max V = UH (MH, YH ) + γ EHUL(ML, YL). (1)
We assume the utility function U is twice differentiable; the
term EHUL represents the household’s expectation at harvest
time (when the storage decision is made) of utility in the posthar-
vest season. The term γ is a scalar discount factor.
5 In our sample, approximately 20% of total sales occur during the harvest
season and 80% during the postharvest season. Data show that 80% of the
most important sale transactions during the postharvest season occur during
the early postharvest period and 20% during the lean period. Data also show
that approximately 19% of households are net buyers, 17% autarkic, and 64%
net sellers during the postharvest season. Fig. 1 explains in which period a
household may sell maize in an agricultural cycle.
6 Grimm (2011) uses evidence from Burkina Faso to show that households’
income matters for school enrolment in settings where households face tight
liquidity constraints caused by the lack of insurance and limited possibilities to
smooth consumption through credit and savings.
We build on Saha and Stroud by adding storage loss un-
certainty to the interseasonal household model. If a household
decides to store maize, access to effective storage technology
is a precondition for successfully transferring grain from one
season to another. Because there is no production during the
postharvest season, grain available during that period depends
on how effectively the storage technology can preserve maize
stored at the end of the harvest season. Thus, the maize stock
at the time of harvest can be viewed as an input into a transfor-
mation function via which the storage technology imperfectly
converts harvested maize into postharvest supply. This storage
constraint is defined as
Q̃L = (1 − δ̃L(T ))SH (2)
where the random variable Q̃L is the amount of maize available
in the postharvest season following storage, T is the storage
technology that the household uses to transfer grain between
periods, and SH is maize placed into storage at harvest time.
The random parameter δ̃L is the proportion of stored maize that
is lost during storage. Ex ante, the distribution of δ̃Ldepends
on the storage technology. The actual storage loss is therefore
not a strictly exogenous constant, as in standard models of
household interseasonal decision making, but instead depends
on a household’s use of a storage technology. A central feature
of the model is that the stochastic portion of maize losses may
be important, which is especially germane in many developing
countries where smallholders have limited access to improved
storage technologies.
Limited access to effective technologies with low values of
δ̃Ltherefore exacerbates consumption and income risk for the
household during the postharvest season. As a result, the house-
hold faces two identical constraints during the harvest and the
postharvest seasons: a technology “grain balance” constraint
and a liquidity constraint.
QH − SH − IH = MH (3a)









SH + AL − SL − ML
] + (1 + r)BH −PLAL =YL.
(4b)
Eq. (3a) defines grain balance at harvest. The household al-
locates the quantity produced (QH ) among consumption (MH )
storage (SH ) and sale (IH ) during the harvest season. In Eq.
(3b) liquidity during the harvest season comes from savings at
the beginning of harvest season (BH−1) and from maize sold
(IH ) during harvest at the market price (PH). The household
can use its previous season savings (BH−1) and sale revenues
(PHIH ) available at harvest to spend on other composite goods
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(YH ).7 The household may also save money (BH ) at the end the
harvest season, which earns interest at the rate r .
Eqs. (4a) and (4b) are defined in a similar fashion as Eqs.
(3a) and (3b) with the subscript (L) representing the postharvest
season. Eq. (4a) states that grain available during the postharvest
season (Q̃L) is obtained through the storage transformation
function (Eq. (2)). The household can also source grain from
the market (AL) at postharvest season price (PL). In Eq.(4a),
SL is the leftover from storage after all grain uses during the
postharvest season. Eq. (4b) states that the household may sell
maize (IL) at price (PL) and spend income and savings on
nonfood goods (YL), while maintaining the liquidity balance.
After substituting Eqs. (3) and (4) into Eq. (1), we obtain
a new objective function where we can derive the first-order
condition (FOC) with respect to the storage decision at harvest.8





1 − EH δ̃L
)
(1 + r) EHPL − PH
+
(
1 − EH δ̃L
)










(1 + r)EH UYL
.
(5)
The above equilibrium can be written more compactly as
∂V
∂SH
≡ P + (1 − EH δ̃L
)
0 − 1 = 0 (6)





and 1 = cov(UYL PL, δ̃L)(1+r)EH UYL .
Saha and Stroud define the parameter 0 as the strength
of the food security and price arbitrage motive. They under-
score that under risk aversion, the coefficient of risk aversion
is greater than income elasticity with respect to the demand for
food consumption so that 0 > 0. Therefore, it is possible to
have storage even if price change between seasons (P ) is less
than or equals to zero. We build on Saha and Stroud by defining
a parameter, 1, as the strength of the storage technology risk,
price risk, and the food security objective. This parameter does
not appear in their original model, implying an assumed value
of zero.9 We instead postulate that 1 might frequently differ
from zero. For instance, if food security motives are stronger
than cash needs, an increase in storage losses may decrease the
7 The household may also spend on storage technologies and/or chemical
protectant. To simplify our model, we consider that storage cost is negligible
in our context, since many farmers have limited access to appropriate storage
technologies and use traditional methods. We also consider that there is no
maize purchase during the harvest season because there is plentiful grain in the
household. But the household might purchase maize during the post-harvest
season.
8 The full derivation is presented in Appendix A.
9 Saha and Stroud (1994) include the parameter (δl) in the storage cost, and
therefore in P . They also include the marginal cost of storage in P.
marginal value assigned to other goods. This could reflect a sit-
uation in which a household must secure maize consumption by
reducing consumption of other goods. However, the scale of the
parameter 1 depends on how strongly farmers value nonfood
goods relative to maize. A household that stores maize with the
intention to sell some or all of it might have a higher marginal
value for other goods than a household that stores for consump-
tion only. By contrast, a household that stores for consumption
only might place a higher marginal value on maize than one
intending to sell. For these reasons, a proper understanding of
grain storage decisions as characterized in Eq. (6) must account
not only for price change and risk but also for risks associated




This study uses data from a survey conducted in 6 of the 12
departments in Benin. We first considered the three regions in
Benin: North, Center, and South. In each region, we used re-
ported maize yield to select the 50th percentile of the most pro-
ductive areas among the departments. However, we retained one
department, Toucoutouna in the North, because of the preva-
lence of food insecurity, even though it was not among the most
productive areas. The other steps of the survey to identify the
households were random. Two districts were randomly cho-
sen within a given department. Counties, called “Commune,”
were also randomly selected in the district, followed by a ran-
dom choice of villages. In the first stage, survey enumerators
conducted a census of maize households in each of the 12
villages to identify the pool of households that produced maize.
In the second stage, 30 households were randomly chosen
among these households. Each household interviewed was the
head of the household.
The survey covered a consumption cycle for each house-
hold (see Fig. 1) for the two waves of data collection, namely
2011/2012 and 2013/2014 harvest seasons. The first wave data
cover 360 households, but only 309 of these households were
successfully interviewed during the second wave or have data
complete set of information.10 We end up with a balanced sam-
ple of 309 households and 618 individual observations in the
balanced panel. Unfortunately, there is no regression-based test
for attrition bias when FE is used with only two time periods,
as three periods of data are needed for such tests (Wooldridge,
2010). The regression models in our analysis control for at-
trition bias to the extent that any attrition is related to the
observed covariates and/or time-constant, unobserved effects
(Mason and Ricker-Gilbert, 2013; Mason and Smale, 2013).
We also find few observable characteristics that explain a house-
hold’s probability to be reinterviewed during the second wave
10 We drop one household that reported a cultivated area more than 51 times
the sample average because it cannot be considered as a smallholder household.
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Table 1
















Maize stored at harvest (kg) 2,555 2,343 2,768 1,643*** 3,046*** (0.00)
(4,4430) (4,505) (4,350) (5,313) (3,790)
Quantity sold at harvest (kg) 208 285 130 178 223 (0.46)
(773) (1002) (427) (667) (825)
Expected storage lossesb (%) 7.8 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.9 (0.75)
(10.8) (10.8) (10.9) (11.9) (10.2)
Savings (×1,000 F CFA) 131 87 175 82*** 158*** (0.00)
(298) (247) (335) (155) (348)
Number of children in school 4 4 4 3* 4* (0.07)
(3) (3) (4) (3) (4)
Harvest price (F CFA) 113 116 110 118** 110** (0.03)
(39) (46) (29) (42) (36)
Expected price change between seasons 84 82 86 87 82 (0.27)
% (F CFA) (45) (54) (41) (48) (44)
Quantity available at harvest (kg) 3,014 2,848 3,187 2,013*** 3,552*** (0.00)
(4,760) (4,953) (4,560) (5,500) (4,220)
Quantity produced at harvest (kg) 2,674 2,440 2,908 1,666*** 3,221*** (0.00)
(3,981) (3,605) (4,317) (3,806) (3,976)
Farm size (ha) 4 4 5 3*** 5*** (0.00)
(5) (4) (6) (3) (6)
Age 44 43 45 46*** 43*** (0.01)
(13) (13) (13) (14) (13)
Household size (#) 11 11 11 10 11 (0.20)
(6.1) (6.3) (5.9) (7) (6)
Number of years in the association 4 3 4 3 4 (0.20)
(6) (6) (7) (6) (6)
Distance from main market (km) 6 6 6 6.4** 5.6** (0.04)
(5) (5) (5) (5) (5)
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses.
aP-value for t-test for mean difference between storage goal; ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
bAs measured in percentage of maize quantity stored from grain managements of previous years; U.S.$ 1.00 = 512 CFA Francs at the time of the survey.
(see Appendix B). In addition, we weight our sample by the in-
verse probability of selection to account for the probability that
the household was randomly sampled for interview. Neverthe-
less, given our relatively small sample, we cannot make a strong
claim that it is fully representative of all maize growers in Benin.
The survey focused on household grain management over
different time periods owing to different geographic locations.
The survey started in July when most households from the South
were at the end of the small harvest season. Households in the
North were interviewed in August, the lean period or the early
beginning of the new harvest season.
4.2. Descriptive statistics for the main variables
When investigating the reason why households in our sam-
ple store maize, we find that 35% of them do so with the single
goal of consuming it, while 60% do so with the goal of con-
suming and selling it. Only 5% of respondents store maize with
the goal of only selling it. We group the two latter types of
households under the category market-oriented households. By
contrast, we define the former as a category of consumption-
oriented households. We find that 79% of the households that
were consumption-oriented households in 2011/2012 remain so
in 2013/2014. Likewise, data show that 88% of market-oriented
households do not change their status in the second wave of data
collection. This pattern could suggest that households’ storage
goal reflect their long-term market participation status, and is
thus quasi-fixed and less likely to be influenced by unobserv-
able, time-varying factors.
We use the quantity (in kilograms) of maize stored at the end
of the harvest season as the dependent variable in our estima-
tion.11 Table 1 shows that the average quantity of maize stored
by consumption-oriented households is about 1,643 kg, whereas
it is about 3,046 kg market-oriented households. Households
store 82% and 86 % of the quantity available at harvest (i.e.,
the quantity produced plus carryover stock) in consumption-
oriented and market-oriented households respectively. Because
the distribution of quantity stored is skewed, we use its
11 Only six observations have quantity stored at harvest that is greater than
the quantity available at harvest (i.e., quantity produced plus carryover stock)
because they received gifts from friends or purchased maize from markets.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistic of discrete variables
Variables Full 2011 2013 =1 If HH’s storage goal
is consumption only
=1 if HH’s storage
goal includes sales
P-valuea
=1 if savings > 0 0.61 0.45 0.77 0.57* 0.64* 0.10
=1 if HH has access to credit 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.09*** 0.20*** 0.00
=1 if household uses chemical protectant 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.18
=1 if presence of input dealer in village 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.18
=1 if presence of extension agent in village 0.42 0.58 0.26 0.33*** 0.47*** 0.00
=1 if household (HH)’s head is male 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.83
=1 if HH’s head attended school 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.43** 0.33** 0.02
=1 if household owns cell phone 0.57 0.38 0.75 0.56 0.57 0.69
Covariates for wealth indexb
=1 if household owns bike 0.52 0.47 0.57 0.47* 0.55* 0.06
=1 if household owns motorbike 0.55 0.44 0.66 0.51 0.57 0.15
=1 if household owns TV 0.22 0.17 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.98
=1 if household owns radio 0.62 0.48 0.77 0.59 0.64 0.28
=1 if household owns metallic roof 0.45 0.36 0.54 0.43 0.46 0.38
=1 if HHs stores for consumption only 0.35 0.34 0.36 1 0 n/a
=1 if HH stores for sale only 0.05 0.04 0.05 0 0.07 n/a
=1 if HH stores for both consumption and sale 0.60 0.62 0.59 0 0.83 n/a
Notes: The number of observation = 618 of which 35% are households that store for consumption only and 65% are households whose storage goal include sale.
aP-value for Chi2 test for frequency difference between storage goal.
bCovariates used to construct an index from a principal component analysis.
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1; n/a = not applicable.
logarithm transformation as the final form of the dependent
variable, quantity of maize stored.
The mean value for naı̈ve expected storage loss is about 8%
in each wave of data collection (see Table 1).12 Thus, there
is little change in the value of storage losses between survey
waves, most likely because households follow the same storage
practices across agricultural seasons. For instance, only 10%
of households that do not use chemical protectant in the first
year use it in the second year. In addition, we do not find a
statistically significant difference for expected storage losses
between households that store for sale and those who store for
consumption only.
Given the limited access to credit in our sample, we prefer
to use the amount of savings that the household owns at the
beginning of harvest and the number of children in school as
the key variables for liquidity constraints. We also adopt a log
transformation for the savings variable to measure an elasticity
of the liquidity effect on the storage supply in the households
depending on this future uses of maize.13 In Table 1, the average
savings is about 131,000 F CFA (about U.S.$ 256) for the whole
sample. Market-oriented households have twice as much money
in savings as consumption-oriented households have. We find
12 Actual storage losses (losses/quantity stored) were 6.6% for the entire
sample, 7.7% in 2011 and 5.5% in 2013. The figures are 7.5% and 6.1%
for consumption-oriented and market-oriented households, respectively. The
difference between the two groups is statistically significant with P-value =
0.06.
13 We use a log hyperbolic sine transformation function. We also use a binary
indicator equals to one when a household has savings at the beginning of the
harvest season and zero otherwise. Point estimates for the savings variable are
similar in sign and statistical significance under this alternative specification in
Appendix C.
that the difference in savings between these two groups is statis-
tically significant. The number of children enrolled in schools
is about four on average. This enrolment rate has not substan-
tially changed over the two years of the data collection whereas
savings has increased on average. Likewise, market-oriented
households enroll one more child than consumption-oriented
households do on average, and the difference is statistically
significant. Overall, we find that few households have recourse
to formal or informal source of credits in our sample, as less than
16% of them have access to credit during the harvest period.
By contrast, 61% of households in our sample have savings at
the beginning of the harvest season (see Table 2).
5. Empirical model
The empirical specification for the maize storage decision
after harvest of household (i) at time (t) is based on the follow-
ing:
Sit = α1δeit + Litα2 + μi + εit, (7)
where Sit represents the log transformation of the kilograms
of maize that the household stores at the end of the harvest
for consumption, and/sales during the postharvest season. As
explained in the conceptual framework, the variable δleit repre-
sents the percentage of maize that a household expects to lose
in storage (during the postharvest season) at the time it makes
its storage decisions during harvest, and α1 is the correspond-
ing parameter to be estimated. Time-constant, unobservable
household-level factors that affect S are represented by μi , and
εit denotes the idiosyncratic time-varying error. We discuss our
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approach for dealing with potential correlation between the er-
ror terms and the right-hand side variable in Eq. (7) in the
identification strategy section.
We record information about expected storage losses by ask-
ing households the amount of maize that they expected to lose
in a maize bag (mostly equivalent to 100 kg in capacity) at the
time they were about to store maize.14 We use this measure of
a household’s naı̈ve expectation to measure expected storage
losses, and test our first hypothesis, namely that expected stor-
age losses have no statistically significant effect on the quantity
of maize that a household stores. This is simply the one-sided
test that α1 < 0 against the null hypothesis that the coefficient
equals zero.
The vector Li t denotes liquidity constraints and α2 represents
the corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated. We test
a second hypothesis, namely that the liquidity constraint has
no statically significant effect on quantity stored. We conduct
this test using the estimated coefficients for variables that proxy
for the liquidity constraint: savings at the start of the harvest
season (for which we expect the coefficient to be positive) and
the number of children in school (for which we expect the point
estimate to be negative). Many studies cite school expenses as
major nonfood expenditure during the harvest season in Benin
and elsewhere in SSA (Adegbola 2010; Burke, 2014; Grimm,
2011). To avoid potential simultaneity bias, we collected infor-
mation on the number of children who were in school during the
previous academic year, since the academic season coincides
with the harvest season in Benin, as in many other West African
countries.
To the parsimonious version of the regression represented by
(7) we add a number of additional variables and interactions to
control for and infer their correlation with the tested covariates.
We include a binary indicator of the household’s storage goal
for its maize. The theoretical framework provides the economic
rationale to include the storage goal (as a proxy for maize
preference). Specifically, the variable takes the value one when
the household stores for sale only or for both consumption and
sales, and the variable equals zero if the maize storage goal is
consumption only. As mentioned earlier, we refer to the first
group as market-oriented households, and the second group
as consumption-oriented households. We obtain this measure
of storage goal from the response given by household heads
by asking them their goals for storing maize at the point of
decision to store. We also add interaction variables between
the storage goal group variable and the tested covariates to
14 Recall that the household reports its expected storage losses for the entire
postharvest season based on its experiences from grain allocation, storage prac-
tices, and grain decay over time. We are confident in this measure because the
accuracy of a respondent’s expectations has been found to be high for reason-
ably common, regular occurring events and when expectation is obtained on
short time horizon (Delavande et al., 2011). Whether bags of maize last one,
two, three months or more, the household still reports its expectation based
on the total amount usually lost during the storage period. Variables such as
quantity of maize available at harvest and storage goal can also reflect how long
a household may store grain and therefore control for duration of storage.
account for the fact that the effect of expected storage losses
and liquidity constraints might depend on households’ storage
goal as suggested in the conceptual framework. In so doing,
we suggest that the effect of the tested covariates on the storage
decision in consumption-oriented households might be different
from the one in market-oriented households.
Other factors that likely condition the household’s storage
decision include the value of a household’s durable assets, maize
quantity available at harvest, harvest price and expected price
difference between harvest and postharvest seasons (see Tables
1 and 2 for the full set of variables we include).15
6. Identification strategy
6.1. Omitted variable bias
Our first econometric challenge is to control for unobserved
heterogeneity that could affect the tested covariates. Some
households may be more aware of pest risk or some could be
more talented and know how to manage pests without using
chemical protectants on their stored maize (Ricker-Gilbert
and Jones, 2015). In addition, each household’s expectation
of maize storage losses is potentially endogeneous because
unobserved characteristics of individuals could determine
both their expectation and their storage behavior (Attanasio,
2009; Delavande et al. 2011). The use of a household-level
FE estimator in panel data allows us to address the issue of
unobserved heterogeneity. The FE estimator demeans the data
and in doing so removes unobserved heterogeneity, (μi) in Eq.
(7) from the model.
In addition to using an FE estimator, we take the additional
step of adding control variables to account for any remain-
ing correlation between key covariates and time-varying unob-
servable factors. First, if expected storage losses depend on a
household’s past grain management experience, there could be
a correlation between expected storage losses and the use of
chemical storage protectant. Chemical protectant is an indirect
input in a household’s storage decision. Indeed, the decision
to use chemical protectants mostly occurs during the planting
season since most households use field pesticides to prevent
maize stocks from pest damage. Some households may also
want to recover their outlay on pesticides by storing maize and
then selling it near to the next planting season. Nevertheless,
controlling for chemical use in the model does not substantially
15 Although a binary indicator for year may account for inflation and other
time-trend effects, it does not substantially change the estimates and the sta-
tistical significance of our estimates (Appendix D). Since there is no price
series available in all the 12 communities of our sample, we obtain naı̈ve price
expectation by asking households their expectation about postharvest season
price at the time they were about to store maize. Their naı̈ve price expectation
could also indicate their transactions costs and bargaining powers that are not
necessary reflected in aggregate price time series at the village level. We use
the village-level price as the most realistic prices for farmers who do not sell
at harvest. We also use the mean average of expected prices at the village level
for farmers who do not intend to sell during the postharvest season.
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change the estimate and the statistical significance of the tested
covariates (Columns 1 and 2, Appendix D). We also account
for the presence of an input dealer in the village. This covariate
might be an implicit indicator of the level of pest infestation
and rural market development in the community. Similarly, we
consider the presence of an extension agent who resides in the
village to suggest how easily a household may have access to
information about storage practices as well as markets. We also
ensure that the tested covariates for liquidity constraints are
exogenous, by controlling for whether a household can access
to credit (formal and/or informal) in the community during the
harvest season. Access to credit does not substantially mod-
ify the estimates and the statistical significance of the tested
covariates (Columns 1 and 3, Appendix D). The time-varying
error term in Eq. (7) is assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed,
after using FE and adding the additional time-varying controls
mentioned above.
6.2. Potential endogeneity of a household’s storage goal
Omitted variable bias could also potentially arise if a house-
hold’s storage goal is not accounted for. As postulated in the
conceptual framework, a household’s storage goal is important
because it accounts for the food security motive and level of risk
aversion. However, the storage goal is a choice variable. Some
unobserved characteristics that influence the probability that a
household chooses a storage goal could also influence the quan-
tity stored once the household decides to store for future sales or
consumption in the postharvest season. Nevertheless, evidence
shows that there is no substantial change in the estimate and the
statistical significance of the tested covariates whether storage
goal is included in or omitted from the model (Columns 2 and 3,
Appendix E1).16 Such a result is also consistent with past stud-
ies that find that accounting for households’ goal with respect
to market participation does not create large endogeneity bias
in food allocation decisions (Berkhout et al., 2010). It could be
that a household’s storage goal reflects long-term maize prefer-
ence and market participation status. In addition, it could be that
the storage goal is correlated with time-constant unobservable
factors, and/or production decisions that occur before storage,
and as a result using a household-level FE estimator and ac-
16 We also test for the potential endogeneity of storage goal by following
a control function approach, where we first estimate the factors that affect
storage goal and then control for omitted variable bias with the generalized
residual derived obtain from the probit equation. We do not find that farmers’
goal is endogenous (Columns 1–1 and 1–2, Appendix E1). We allow different
coefficients across two storage goals and follow an approach recently proposed
by Murtazashivili and Wooldridge (2016). We do not find evidence of selection
bias (Columns 1–1 and 1–2, Appendix E2). Note that we obtain results in
Appendices E1 (Columns 1–1 and 1–2) and E2 (Columns 1–1 and 1–2) using
a CRE (correlated random effect [RE]) estimator. The CRE controls for a
household’s unobserved heterogeneity by modeling it as a linear function of
the time average of all time-varying covariates. The CRE provides estimates
analogous to the FE. Our main results for the full sample remain also valid
when the sample is separated in two groups of households depending on their
storage goal (see Appendix E3).
counting for maize production may take care of this potential
endogeneity issue.
6.3. Reverse causality and simultaneity bias
We use the household’s expectation about storage losses as
the main covariate for the storage technology constraint. Expec-
tations are indeed useful predictors of economic behavior, but
their validity depends on the different methods used for elicit-
ing such information (Delavande et al., 2011). That we obtain
expected storage losses from the respondent household head’s
direct elicitation at the time when storage losses have already
occurred may raise concerns of possible reverse causality. How-
ever, we model maize prices and storage losses naı̈vely, based on
prior experience with storage losses and grain management. In
fact, a household’s storage practices and expectation about stor-
age losses change little across agricultural seasons. As such, we
remain confident that respondents state their expectation about
storage losses based on their experience in grain management
from the previous year. Simultaneity bias is unlikely to be an
issue for the same reasons. Likewise, the variables for savings
and the number of children in school are both determined prior
to the storage decision. Households report their savings at the
beginning of the harvest season. They also indicate the number
of children in school during the academic year preceding the
survey. Thus, we can also likely rule out any reverse causality
and simultaneity bias concerning these variables.
7. Econometric results
Table 3 presents the results for factors affecting the amount
of maize that the household stores at the end of the harvest
season for use later in the year. Results are obtained using a
household-level FE estimator.17 Model (1) presents the results
of the parsimonious regression that includes only the covariates
related to our main research objectives, and a constant, while
model (2) adds additional controls to the model. In model (3)
we consider the parsimonious regression along with an interac-
tion term between the tested covariates and households’ storage
goals, where the variable store for sale equals one if the house-
hold’s storage goal for maize includes selling it in the posthar-
vest season (i.e., market-oriented households). We estimate a
model (4) that represents the full specification of the model (3).
In models (1) and (2), we find that the estimate for expected
storage losses has a negative effect on the amount of maize
a household stores at harvest. Although the sign of the esti-
mate makes economic sense, it is only statistically significant
in model (1), and loses statistical significance when additional
controls are added in model (2). However, models (3) and (4)
show that the effect of expected storage losses on the storage
17 We carried out a Haussmann test to find that the null hypothesis of efficient
and consistent estimator of the RE is rejected against the FE estimator with
P-value < 0.01. Our results are also unchanged when we cluster the standard
errors at the village level. Appendix F also presents the FE results benchmarked
against the OLS estimations (as requested by a referee).
10 D. Kadjo et al./Agricultural Economics 00 (2018) 1–20
Table 3
Factors that affect the amount of maize stored at harvest (fixed-effect estimator used)
Dependent variable = Log(Quantity Stored) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Parsimonious Full Parsimonious + Interaction terma Full + Interaction terma
Expected losses (×100) −0.0148* −0.0085 −0.0013 0.0013
(0.0078) (0.0062) (0.0057) (0.0055)
Log (Savings) 0.0097** 0.0035 0.0246** 0.0105*
(0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0101) (0.0060)
No. of children in school 0.0335 −0.0156 0.0049 −0.0619
(0.0490) (0.0344) (0.0597) (0.0400)
Store for saleb × Expected Losses (×100) −0.0383*** −0.0275***
(0.0109) (0.0092)
Store for sale × Log (Savings) −0.0218* −0.0088
(0.0111) (0.0067)
Store for sale × No. of children in School 0.0328 0.0617**
(0.0444) (0.0310)
Store for sale 0.4198*** 0.9992*** 0.6190***
(0.1157) (0.2627) (0.1962)
Harvest price (F CFA/kg) −0.0030*** −0.0035***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
Expect. price change (F CFA/kg) −0.0006 −0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Quantity available at harvest (kg) 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(2.2E-05) (2.2E-05)
Household size 0.0092 0.0114
(0.0113) (0.0113)
Total farm size (ha) 0.0092 0.0093
(0.0157) (0.0148)
Wealth index 0.0941** 0.0870*
(0.0475) (0.0461)
=1 if HH owns a cell phone 0.1671 0.1427
(0.1022) (0.0990)
=1 if input dealer in village 0.1023 0.0757
(0.1337) (0.1355)
=1 if extension agent in village 0.1085 0.1367
(0.0938) (0.0951)
Constant 7.0826*** 6.4689*** 6.4928*** 6.4289***
(0.1895) (0.2734) (0.2532) (0.2737)
Observations 618 618 618 618
Adjusted R2 0.0365 0.4820 0.1145 0.5010
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses with cluster at the household level; data are weighted by the inverse probability of selection.
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
aInteraction term between household’s storage goal and the tested covariates (expected storage losses, savings, and number of children in school); U.S.$ 1.00 = 512
CFA Francs at the time of the survey.
bStore for sale = 1 if household’s storage goal for maize includes selling it later in the agricultural season and zero otherwise.
decision could be better understood by accounting for the in-
teraction term between the tested covariates and a household’s
storage goal. In these specifications, we find that the coefficient
estimate on expected storage losses has a statistically significant
and negative effect on the quantity of maize stored for market-
oriented households only. In model (4), the joint t-test for the
statistical significance of expected storage losses and its interac-
tion with the variable store for sale equals one (market-oriented
households) has a P-value equals (0.00). The joint estimate sug-
gests that a 1% point increase in expected storage losses results
in about 2.6 % decrease in the quantity of maize store at harvest
in market-oriented households. Therefore, for market-oriented
households that store maize at harvest for sale later in the year,
we can reject hypothesis (1) that the amount of maize that a
household expects to lose due to pests has no statistically sig-
nificant effect on the quantity of maize that a household stores
after harvest. This result makes sense as the covariate expected
storage losses could represent an important operational cost that
market-oriented households do not want to bear because it has
a negative effect on their income. Instead, the fact that we find
no statistically significant effect of expected storage losses on
quantity of maize stored for consumption-oriented households
is likely because they have no other option but to bear the cost
of losing maize to insect pests in storage.
The estimate for liquidity constraint, first measured as the
value of savings at harvest, affects maize storage is also quite
robust across specifications in Table 3. In model (1) where there
is a parsimonious estimation with no interaction term, we find
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that a 1% increase in savings increases the quantity of maize
stored at harvest by nearly 0.01%. This result seems to suggest
that households that have greater liquidity before the harvest
season store more maize on average. Yet the coefficient loses
statistical significance in the full estimation in model (2). As
we might expect by relying on the theoretical framework, we
obtain insights from differentiating the effect of savings by
households’ storage goal. Results in models (3) and (4) sug-
gest that consumption-oriented households store more maize
when they have more savings at the beginning of the harvest
season. These results are therefore consistent with one strand of
the literature underscoring that access to credit improves inter-
seasonal household decision (Burke 2014; Stephens and Bar-
rett, 2011). Model (4) suggests that a 1% increase in savings
for consumption-oriented households increases the quantity of
maize stored by 0.01% for this group on average. Therefore, for
consumption-oriented households, we can reject the hypothesis
(2) that the liquidity constraint has no statically significant effect
on quantity stored. Although the estimate is not large, the joint
t-test for savings and its interaction with households’ storage
goal shows, on the contrary, that in market-oriented households,
the elasticity of the savings effect on the storage decision is al-
most zero in economic magnitude in model (3) (2.8E − 03) and
not statistically significant in model (4). Likewise, the effect
of the number of children in school is not statistically signifi-
cant in market-oriented households. The coefficient estimate on
this variable has the expected negative effect in consumption-
oriented households, but it is also not statistically significant.18
These results reveal that consumption-oriented households
need liquidity at the beginning of the harvest seasons more
than market-oriented households do. This result is logical since
it is easier for consumption-oriented households to meet food
consumption needs at harvest than it is for them to purchase
nonfood items. On the contrary, our results could suggest
that market-oriented households are less reliant on short-term
liquidity constraints to make interseasonal household decisions
about storage. One could imagine that even if these households
have no access to credit markets at all, they may still achieve a
high degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing through
the use of assets as buffers (Deaton, 1991). Indeed, we find
that households’ assets have a positive and statistical effect on
the amount of maize stored at harvest, which is consistent with
earlier research from elsewhere in SSA (Stephens and Barrett,
2011).
7.1. Study limitations
Several caveats should be kept in mind when considering our
results. First, it is possible that our estimates could gain effi-
18 In model 4, the coefficient estimate for number of children in school
shows that one additional child in school reduces the quantity stored by 6% in
consumption-oriented households, but with P-value = 0.12. This coefficient is
about zero in economic magnitude (0.02%) in market-oriented households, and
the P-value of the joint t-test is also about 0.12.
ciency by modeling household storage decisions jointly with
other decision variables during the harvest period such as con-
sumption or sales. However, we believe that broader economic
incentives of storage, food consumption, labor, and chemical
use are not necessary for our estimation. Because our main in-
terest is to obtain consistent coefficient estimates for the tested
covariates, we sacrifice some possible efficiency for consistency
in a well-specified and estimated single equation. Second, food
consumption varies little during the harvest season when maize
is plentiful, so the consumption decision is already accounted
for with the observable covariates including the household’s
storage goals and size, along with using an FE estimator to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity. Third, any harvest and input
decision has mainly a recursive effect on storage through the
quantity of maize available at harvest and/or the tested covari-
ates, and this has already been addressed in our analysis.
8. Conclusion
In this article, we extend previous models of a smallholder
farm household’s decisions about grain storage. We account
for technology and liquidity constraints, while controlling for
whether households store maize with the main goal of consump-
tion or sale. Specifically, we test how a household’s expectation
about storage losses along with its liquidity at harvest, proxied
by its savings and the number of children in school affect its
decision to store maize at harvest. In doing so, this article helps
explain important postharvest decision-making factors faced
by smallholder farm households in the developing world. This
is extremely relevant to policy actions amidst the growing in-
terests for reducing PHLs and improving grain management in
SSA (Affognon et al., 2015; Kaminski and Christiaensen, 2014;
World Bank, 2011).
Although we refrain from making strong causal inferences
from observational data, our results are consistent with previ-
ous findings. In addition, they extend the literature by providing
insights based on a household’s goals of storing maize for home
consumption and/or for selling. Our key findings are as follows.
First, we find that expected storage losses deter households
whose storage goal for maize includes storing it for sale later
in the year from storing more maize at harvest. This may oc-
cur because these more market-oriented households likely view
storage losses as an operational cost that they want to minimize.
Second, we suggest that liquidity matters more in households
that mainly store maize for food consumption than in house-
holds whose storage goal includes sale during the postharvest
season. Therefore, we conclude that liquidity constraints cause
consumption-oriented households to sell maize for a low price
at harvest, whereas storage technology constraints drive market-
oriented households to “sell low” as well.
These results show that PHLs cannot be neglected in ru-
ral households’ decisions about grain management. Lower
losses reported in some recent studies, such as Kaminski and
Christiaensen (2014) could, in fact, come from concerns that
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smallholders have about storage losses given the current inef-
fective technologies available to them. Our results suggest that
concerns about storage losses cause some households to store
less at harvest and sell early in the postharvest season for a
lower price rather than storing in hopes of obtaining a higher
price later in the year.
Overall, evidence underscore the importance of policies that
seek to improve grain management for smallholders in SSA.
Our findings call for policies that promote modern storage tech-
nology alongside liquidity access, but with different targeting
mechanisms depending on a household’s current goal for stor-
ing its maize. For example, in areas where smallholders are
more consumption-oriented, the main constraint appears to be
the limited access to liquidity that could trap these households
in a cycle of food insecurity. Yet many consumption-oriented
households are hardly viable borrowers because they are rel-
atively costly to serve (Hardaker et al., 1998). In this case,
short-term cash transfers, assistance in organizing households
into village savings groups, or providing linkages to microfi-
nance institutions could help relieve these constraints. In con-
trast, policies that promote better access to modern storage
technologies could contribute to reducing the quantity of maize
that smallholders lose in storage. This would seem to be particu-
larly beneficial to market-oriented households that view storage
losses as a cost that they want to reduce.
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Appendix A: An interseasonal household model with
storage technology constraint adapted from Saha and
Stroud (1994)
Objective function
Max V = UH (MH, YH ) + γ EHUL(ML, YL). (A.1)
Technology constraint in interseasonal decision
Q̃L =
(





= M H (Quantity balance during harvest season) (A.3a)
PH IH + BH−1 − BH
= YH (Liquidity balance during harvest season) (A.3b)
Accounting for (A.3a) we can rewrite Eq. (A.3b) as follows:
P H
(
Q H − SH − M H
) + B H−1 − B H = YH (A.3c)
Q̃L + AL − Sl − Il
= ML (Quantity balance during post − harvest season)
(A.4a)




SH + AL − Sl − Il = M L (A.4b)
PLIL + (1 + r)BH −PLAL
= YL (Liquidity balance during post − harvest season)
(A.4c)













SH − Sl − M L
] + (1 + r) B H = YL (A.4e)
Objective function modified when sales are residual
Max V = UH { MH,PH (QH − SH − MH ) + BH−1 − BH }




SH − Sl − ML]
+ (1 + r) BH } (A.5)
FOCs with respect to three endogenous variables (consump-
tion, savings, & storage)
∂V
∂MH
≡ UMH − PH UYH = 0 (A.6)
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∂V
∂BH
≡ −UYH + γ (1 + r) EH UYL = 0 (A.7a)
Eq. (A.7a) implies:
UYH = γ (1 + r) EH UYL (A.7b)
∂V
∂SH





)} = 0 (A.8a)
∂V
∂SH











− γ cov (UYLPL, δ̃L
) = 0 (A.8c)
∂V
∂SH
≡ −PH UYH + γ
(








+ cov (UYL, PL
)
] − γ cov (UYLPL, δ̃L
) = 0
(A.8d)
Accounting for Eq. (A.7b), we can rewrite Eq. (A.8d) as
follows:
− PH γ (1 + r) EH UYL + γ
(





+ cov (UYL, PL
) ] − γ cov (UYLPL, δ̃L
) = 0 (A.9a)
Diving Eq. (A.9a) by γ (1 + r)EH UYL
− PH +
(
1 − EH δ̃L
) EHPL
1 + r +
(











(1 + r) EH UYL
= 0 (A.9b)
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≡ P + (1 − EH δ̃L
)
0 − 1 = 0 (A.9d)
Where P = (1−EH δ̃L)(1+r) EHPL − PH
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Appendix B: Probability for a household to be
re-interviewed in the wave 2 (Attrition bias)
Dependent Var. = 1 if HH Head is
interviewed twice (Wave 1 & 2)
Average partial effect (APE)




Harvest prices (F CFA/kg) 9.93E-04
(8.98E-04)
Expected price change (F CFA/kg) 4.30E-04
(4.68E-04)
Quantity available at harvest (kg) −7.19E-06
(5.41E-06)
=1 if HH’s head attended school 7.84E-04
(0.0490)




# Years in the village 0.00255
(0.00188)
Total farm size (Ha) 0.0234*
(0.0134)
Distance from market (Km) 0.00155
(0.00527)
=1 if Input dealer in village −0.0447
(0.0937)




Department dummies included Yes
Observations 354
Pseudo R-squared 0.070
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1; 1
household was an outlier for production size, 5 observations were dropped
because of missing or inconsistent information during the second wave of data
collection; the number of children in school for wave 1 was obtained as a
recall variable during the second wave, and therefore could not be collected for
dropped households; US$ 1.00 = 512 CFA Francs at the time of the survey.
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Appendix C: Factors that affect the amount of maize
stored at harvest – Alternative measure for savings (Fixed
Effect estimator used)
Dependent variable = Log(Quantity Stored) Main results
Expected losses (%) 0.0010
(0.0054)
=1 if Savings > 0 0.2275*
(0.1285)
# of children in school −0.0614
(0.0399)
Store for salea x Exp. Losses −0.0272***
(0.0092)
Store for sale x ( = 1 if Savings > 0) −0.1956
(0.1496)
Store for sale x (# of children in school) 0.0609**
(0.0309)
Store for sale 0.6279***
(0.1971)
Harvest price (F CFA/kg) −0.0035***
(0.0011)
Expected price change (F CFA/kg) −0.0005
(0.0010)








=1 if HH owns a cell phone 0.1473
(0.0983)
=1 if Input dealer in village 0.0765
(0.1360)






Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
aStore for sale = 1 if household’s storage goal for maize includes selling it later in the year, otherwise it takes the value zero; US$ 1.00 = 512 CFA Francs at the time
of the survey.
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Appendix D: Factors that affect the amount of maize
stored at harvest – Additional covariates (Fixed Effect
estimator used)
Dependent variable = Log(Quantity Stored) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Main regression Main + Chemical protectant Main + Access to credit Main + Time dummy
Expected losses (%) 0.0013 0.00210 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0056)
Log (Savings) 0.0105* 0.0102* 0.0104* 0.0111*
(0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0061)
Number of children in school −0.0619 −0.0597 −0.06112 −0.0618
(0.0400) (0.0408) (0.04032) (0.0399)
Store for salea x Exp. Losses −0.0275*** −0.0275*** −0.02687*** −0.0274***
(0.0092) (0.0091) (0.00932) (0.0091)
Store for sale x Log(Savings) −0.0088 −0.0084 −0.0089 −0.0089
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Store for sale x (# of child. in school) 0.0617** 0.0622** 0.0626** 0.0660**
(0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0315) (0.0311)
Store for sale 0.6190*** 0.6161*** 0.6253*** 0.6030***
(0.1962) (0.1989) (0.1963) (0.1968)
=1 if HH uses chemical protectant 0.1090
(0.1422)
=1 if HH has access to credit −0.0811
(0.0818)
=1 if panel is second wave −0.0628
(0.0745)
Harvest price (F CFA/kg) −0.0035*** −0.0033*** −0.0035*** −0.0035***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Expected price change (F CFA/kg) −0.0005 −0.0006 −0.0005 −0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Qty. available at harvest (kg) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(2.1E-05) (2.1E-05) (2.1E-05) (2.2E-05)
Household size 0.0114 0.01292 0.0111 0.0120
(0.0113) (0.01135) (0.0113) (0.0115)
Total farm size (Ha) 0.0093 0.0098 0.0101 0.0104
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0147)
Wealth index 0.0870* 0.0874* 0.0865* 0.0982*
(0.0461) (0.0469) (0.0460) (0.0506)
=1 if HH owns a cell phone 0.1427 0.1456 0.1494 0.1561
(0.0990) (0.0992) (0.0995) (0.1037)
=1 if Input dealer in village 0.0757 0.0608 0.0555 0.0483
(0.1355) (0.1377) (0.1333) (0.1318)
=1 if extension agent in village 0.1367 0.1362 0.1345 0.1017
(0.0951) (0.0955) (0.0953) (0.0865)
Constant 6.4289*** 6.3822*** 6.4353*** 6.4621***
(0.2737) (0.2848) (0.2743) (0.2702)
Observations 618 618 618 618
Adjusted R-squared 0.5010 0.5018 0.5015 0.5011
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
aStore for sale = 1 if household’s storage goal for maize includes selling it later in the year, otherwise it takes the value zero; US$ 1.00 = 512 CFA Francs at the time
of the survey.
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Appendix E1: Test of endogeneity for storage goal
(Intercept effect)
(1–1) (1–2) (2) (3)
Store for salea Log (Qty stored) Log (Qty stored) Log (Qty stored)
Probit-CRE OLS-CRE FE FE




Store for salea 0.2449 0.4198***
(0.5969) (0.1157)
Expected losses (%) −0.0026 −0.0090 −0.0085 −0.0096
(0.0040) (0.0076) (0.0062) (0.0065)
Log (Savings) 0.0011 0.0038 0.0035 0.0041
(0.0019) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0036)
Number of children in school 0.0270 −0.0101 −0.0156 −0.0034
(0.0172) (0.0410) (0.0344) (0.0361)
Harvest price (F CFA/kg) −0.0007 −0.0032** −0.0030*** −0.0034***
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Exp. price change (F CFA/kg) −0.0003 −0.0007 −0.0006 −0.0008
(0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Qty. available at harvest (kg) 7.4E-04 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(4.8E-06) (2.3E-05) (2.2E-05) (2.2E-05)
Household size −0.0030 0.0088 0.0092 0.0081
(0.0041) (0.0124) (0.0113) (0.0115)
Total farm size (Ha) −0.0078 0.0088 0.0092 0.0079
(0.0100) (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0167)
Wealth index 0.0058 0.0957* 0.0941** 0.0949*
(0.0257) (0.0499) (0.0475) (0.0500)
=1 if HH owns a cell phone −0.0890 0.1522 0.1671 0.1272
(0.0560) (0.1231) (0.1022) (0.1020)
=1 if input dealer in village −0.0089 0.0980 0.1023 0.0995
(0.0428) (0.1508) (0.1337) (0.1341)
=1 if extension agent in village −0.0182 0.1027 0.1085 0.1045
(0.0480) (0.1019) (0.0938) (0.0982)
Age 0.0003 −0.0036
(0.0020) (0.0031)
=1 if HH’s head attended school −0.0498 −0.0806
(0.0524) (0.1020)
=1 if HH is male 0.0413 0.2333*
(0.0868) (0.1398)
Distance from main mark. (Km) 0.0048 0.0068
(0.0061) (0.0134)
Department dummies Yes Yes
Time Average Yes Yes
Constant −1.0300 5.2345*** 6.4689*** 6.8156***
(0.8832) (0.3973) (0.2734) (0.2488)
Observations 618 618 618 618
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.1887 0.7526 0.4820 0.4550
Notes: aStore for sale = 1 if household’s storage goal for maize includes selling it later in the year; Robust standard errors in parentheses and bootstrapped in column
1–2; ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1; US$ 1.00 = 512 CFA Francs at the time of the survey.
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Appendix E2: Test of endogeneity switching effect for
storage goal (Slope effect)
Endogenous switching regression Without endogenous
1–1 1–2 2-Log
Store for salea Log(Qty. stored) (Quantity Stored)
Probit-CRE FE-Coef. FE-Coef.




Residuals x Store for salea 0.2200
(0.4802)
Expected losses (%) −0.0026 −0.0018 0.0013
(0.0040) (0.0114) (0.0055)
Log (Savings) 0.0011 0.0121 0.0105*
(0.0019) (0.0084) (0.0060)
Number of children in school 0.0270 −0.0365 −0.0619
(0.0172) (0.0572) (0.0400)
Store for salea x Exp. Losses −0.0249** −0.0275***
(0.0113) (0.0092)
Store for salea x Log(Savings) 0.0590 −0.0088
(0.0380) (0.0067)
Store for salea x # of child. in school −0.0095 0.0617**
(0.0087) (0.0310)
Store for salea 0.0421 0.6190***
(1.2455) (0.1962)
Harvest price (F CFA/kg) −0.0007 −0.0043* −0.0035***
(0.0007) (0.0023) (0.0011)
Exp. Price Change (F CFA/kg) −0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0022) (0.0010)
Qty. available at harvest (kg) 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Household size −0.0030 0.0142 0.0114
(0.0041) (0.0213) (0.0113)
Total farm size (Ha) −0.0078 −0.0527 0.0093
(0.0100) (0.0665) (0.0148)
Wealth index 0.0058 0.1053 0.0870*
(0.0257) (0.0831) (0.0461)
=1 if HH owns a cell phone −0.0890 0.1947 0.1427
(0.0560) (0.1797) (0.0990)
=1 if input dealer in village −0.0089 0.0616 0.0757
(0.0428) (0.4833) (0.1355)




Constant −1.0300 6.9748*** 6.4289***
(0.8832) (0.9814) (0.2737)
Observations 618 618 618
Pseudo R-square/Adjusted R2 0.1887 0.5027 0.5010
Notes: aStore for sale = 1 if household’s storage goal for maize includes selling it later in the year; Robust standard errors in parentheses and bootstrapped in column
1–2; ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1; US$ 1.00 = 512 CFA Francs at the time of the survey; Results in Column 1–1 are identical to those in Column 1–1 (Appendix
E-1)—some covariates are not shown; Column 1–2 includes full interaction terms, and covariates without interactions are interpreted as for Store for sale = 0.
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Appendix E3: Factors that affect the amount of maize
stored at harvest- Separated sample (Fixed Effect
estimator used)
Dependent Variable: Log(Quantity Stored) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Market-oriented HHs Market-oriented HHs Consumption-oriented HHs Consumption-oriented HHs
Expected losses (%) −0.0247** −0.0299** −0.0078 −0.0069
(0.0106) (0.0147) (0.0112) (0.0178)
Log (Savings) −0.0021 −0.0004 0.0103* 0.0097
(0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0063) (0.0115)
Number of children in school −0.0016 0.0394 −0.0610 −0.0727
(0.0424) (0.0604) (0.0830) (0.1181)
Harvest price (F CFA/kg) −0.0025 −0.0036* −0.0030 −0.0026
(0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0043)
Expected price change (F CFA/kg) −0.0022* −0.0028* −0.0008 −0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0029)
Qty available at harvest (kg) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0001
(3E-05) (3E-05) (5E-05) (0.0001)
Household size 0.0201* 0.0164 −0.0003 0.0005
(0.0107) (0.0152) (0.0213) (0.0286)
Total Farm size (Ha) 0.0037 0.0010 0.1385* 0.1434
(0.0088) (0.0123) (0.0768) (0.1142)
Wealth index 0.0800 0.0875 0.1350 0.1330
(0.0489) (0.0621) (0.1321) (0.1443)
=1 if HH owns a cell phone −0.0083 −0.1280 −0.1675 −0.1341
(0.0989) (0.1440) (0.2283) (0.2735)
=1 if Input dealer in village −0.0831 −0.0849 0.1300 0.1328
(0.1468) (0.1796) (0.5921) (1.7440)
=1 if Input extension agent in village 0.0926 0.0439 0.0189 0.0234
(0.1004) (0.1213) (0.1519) (0.2386)
Inverse Mill ratio for selection bias 1.0722 −0.1927
(0.9989) (1.2816)
Constant 7.2640*** 6.9624*** 6.4112*** 6.1792***
(0.3032) (0.4564) (0.5200) (1.5095)
Observations 402 402 216 216
Adjusted R2 0.5039 0,5123 0.3840 0.3813
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses and bootstrapped in columns 2 & 4; ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1; P-value associated with log(Savings) is 0.106 in
columns 3; US$ 1.00 = 512 CFA Francs at the time of the survey; because the sample size in columns 3 & 4 is small, the statistical significance of the tested variable
(Savings) is lower than it is in the full sample.
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Appendix F: Factors that affect the amount of maize
stored at harvest (FE vs OLS estimations)
Dependent variable: log(Quantity Stored) (1) (2) (3) (4)
FE OLS full sample OLS = 1 if panel is 2011 OLS = 1 if panel is 2013
Expected losses (%) 0.0013 −0.0018 −0.0038 −1.1E-05
(0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0066) (0.0051)
Log(savings) 0.0105* 0.0111** 0.0010 0.0177**
(0.0060) (0.0049) (0.0086) (0.0072)
Number of children in school −0.0619 0.0047 −0.0073 0.0207
(0.0400) (0.0297) (0.0397) (0.0263)
Store for sale x Expected Losses −0.02.75*** −0.0077 −0.0026 −0.0079
(0.0092) (0.0064) (0.0094) (0.0077)
Store for sale x Log(savings) −0.0088 −0.0065 0.0103 −0.0241***
(0.0067) (0.0059) (0.0098) (0.0086)
Store for sale x Nb. of child. in school 0.0617** −0.0123 0.0023 −0.0233
(0.0310) (0.0304) (0.0420) (0.0298)
=1 if store for sale 0.6190*** 0.7250*** 0.5312*** 0.9866***
(0.1962) (0.1432) (0.1828) (0.1982)
Harvest price (F CFA/kg) −0.0035*** −0.0056*** −0.0050*** −0.0047***
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0018)
Expected price change (F CFA/kg) −0.0005 −0.0008 −0.0005 −0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0015)
Quantity available at harvest (kg) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Household size 0.0114 0.0315*** 0.0326*** 0.0256**
(0.0113) (0.0075) (0.0094) (0.0099)
Total farm size (Ha) 0.0093 0.0190* 0.0428** 0.0081
(0.0148) (0.0106) (0.0205) (0.0117)
Wealth index 0.0870* −0.0223 0.0087 −0.0232
(0.0461) (0.0342) (0.0402) (0.0431)
=1 if HH owns a cell phone 0.1427 0.2582*** 0.1289 0.2637**
(0.0990) (0.0818) (0.0934) (0.1228)
=1 if input dealer in village 0.0757 0.1469 0.3406** −0.0102
(0.1355) (0.0991) (0.1386) (0.1548)
=1 if extension agent in village 0.1367 0.1478* −0.0788 0.3885***
(0.0951) (0.0752) (0.1064) (0.1445)
Constant 6.4289*** 6.1506*** 6.2949*** 5.9566***
(0.2737) (0.1841) (0.2380) (0.3053)
Observations 618 618 309 309
Adjusted R-squared 0.5010 0.7110 0.6690 0.7596
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1; 1Store for sale = 1 if household’s storage goal for maize includes selling it later in
the year, otherwise it takes the value zero; US$ 1.00 = 512 CFA Francs at the time of the survey.
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